CONFERENCE ON DISARMAMENT

CD/PV.629
6 August 1992

ENGLISH

FINAL RECORD OF THE SIX HUNDRED AND TWENTY-NINTH PLENARY MEETING

Held at the Palais des Nations, Geneva,
on Thursday, 6 August 1992, at 10 a.m.

President: Mr. Paul O'Sullivan (Australia)

GE.92-62560/4802B (E)

The PRESIDENT: I declare open the 629th plenary meeting of the Conference on Disarmament.

As announced at our last plenary meeting, I intend to put before the Conference today for adoption the report of the Ad Hoc Committee on Radiological Weapons. We shall proceed to do so once the list of speakers is exhausted. I should like also to inform you that, immediately after this plenary meeting, the Conference will hold an open-ended consultation on the draft report to the General Assembly, during which I hope we will advance substantially our work on that question.

I have on my list of speakers for today the representatives of France, Chile, the Chairman of the Ad Hoc Committee on Effective International Arrangements to Assure Non-nuclear-weapon States against the Use or Threat of Use of Nuclear Weapons, Canada, Romania, the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland, Finland and Japan. I now give the floor to the representative of France, Ambassador Errera.

Mr. ERRERA (France) (translated from French): I have already had an opportunity, Sir, during my last statement to the Conference, to tell you how pleased my delegation was to see you presiding over our work with your competence, authority and high ideals. As you come to the end of your term of office, allow me simply to add that we have greatly appreciated, and in the coming hours or coming days - a crucial period in our work - we will continue to appreciate, your great qualities and the important role that your country plays within the Conference.

I asked for the floor to announce to the Conference that on 3 August, France formally deposited its instruments of accession to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT) with the three depositary Governments, the United States of America, the United Kingdom and the Russian Federation, as successor to the USSR. As is well known, it was the arms control and disarmament plan submitted by France on 3 June 1991 that contained my country's decision in principle to accede to the NPT. The domestic accession procedure was recently completed with the unanimous - I stress this point - adoption by the French Parliament of the law authorizing the Government to accede to the Treaty. When depositing its instruments of accession, France stressed that in becoming a party to the Treaty it confirmed its long-standing commitment to prevent the proliferation of nuclear weapons and to contribute to disarmament. It acted in conformity with its responsibilities in this field, responsibilities which it has always shouldered. Indeed, France solemnly declared in 1968 that it would henceforth behave exactly like the States which decided to become parties to the Treaty. Our formal accession is an illustration of our resolve to take an active part in the general effort to combat the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction, one of the major priorities of the international community, as was recalled by the Security Council meeting at head of State and government level on 31 January.

(Mr. Errera, France)

France firmly intends to strive, in cooperation with its partners, for the universality of the Treaty and its extension in 1995 for an indefinite period, and to seek the broadest possible international consensus on the subject of nuclear non-proliferation. The strengthening of the non-proliferation regime should, we feel, make it easier to reconcile strict respect for the imperatives of non-dissemination of nuclear weapons and the legitimate use of the peaceful applications of atomic energy, under international control, which can meet energy and economic development needs.

Every day brings further confirmation of the growing interdependence between international security, disarmament and non-proliferation. The impulse we are now observing for a real reduction in nuclear overarmament, the strengthening of the international consensus against the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction, and the fresh prospects for the peaceful settlement of certain regional conflicts, are all positive factors which consolidate security for each and every one of us. For the task is indeed, in particular for the great majority of developing countries, which comply with their commitments, that of reconciling the upsurge in cooperation with the industrialized countries with the constraints imposed by international security. And where better to achieve such a balance than in the multilateral context?

The nuclear-weapon States have a crucial role to play in this process. The fact that all five of them are now parties to the NPT undoubtedly creates new conditions in this regard. As far as the security of non-nuclear-weapon States is concerned, France will, inter alia, step up the efforts it has already undertaken, in particular in the Conference on Disarmament, in order to allow those States which have signed an international undertaking not to acquire nuclear weapons to enjoy a legally binding assurance on the part of the nuclear-weapon States not to use or threaten to use nuclear weapons.

This is the information I wished to put before the Conference. We attach the greatest possible importance to the role which the Conference on Disarmament can and must play in helping to build a fairer and safer international order.

The PRESIDENT: I thank the representative of France for his statement and for the kind words he addressed to the Chair. I now give the floor to the representative of Chile, Ambassador Tironi.

Mr. TIRONI (Chile) (translated from Spanish): Mr. President, it gives me great satisfaction to take the floor for the first time in this Conference at a time when you are in the Chair. We congratulate you again on your active role at its head and the important part that Australia has played in giving impetus to the negotiations on chemical weapons this year. Allow me also to welcome the recent announcement by the Ambassador of France of France's formal accession to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons.

(Mr. Tironi, Chile)

We have asked for the floor because the member and non-member countries of this Conference have been invited to express their views on the draft chemical weapons convention which appears in document 400/Rev.1. Consequently I shall first refer to this subject and then to some other matters relating to disarmament.

It is no secret to anyone in this room that Chile supports the option of giving the international community a convention that will completely and finally ban chemical weapons. We have also said that we wish to be among the first to be parties to the future international instrument, and at the subregional level we have signed what is known as the Mendoza Agreement with Argentina and Brazil which transformed this internal decision into an international commitment. We also value what has been said in the Cartagena Declaration on the same topic, which was signed by the Andean countries.

Bearing this background in mind, my Government embarked on a careful study of the draft in question, and reached the conclusion that overall this convention is acceptable for Chile. As other delegations have found, this text is not fully satisfactory in some aspects as far as we are concerned, but we are aware that like any other outcome of negotiations, a set of compromises have been reached that it would be damaging to break. Hence we are ready to accept aspects that are not satisfactory because we feel the time to adopt this convention is now. We have no right to defer this agreement any further. If we do not take advantage of the prevailing political momentum and the positive attitudes of the majority of delegations present in this forum, there is a risk that this convention could be deferred, perhaps indefinitely. Furthermore, it would deal a harsh blow to faith in the ability of this Conference to be the proper place for reaching disarmament on the scale yearned for by the international community today.

For my country one unsatisfactory aspect of the draft convention as it now stands is the distribution of seats on the executive council. Besides the political significance of this matter, we are concerned at the precedent that may be laid for future disarmament conventions. The distribution of seats on the executive council has been clearly unfavourable to Latin America vis-à-vis other regions. We believe that the constructive approach shown by our region in the negotiations on chemical weapons has not been given due recognition. In addition, the proportion of permanent seats on the basis of chemical industry seems to us excessive in the case of Latin America. We feel it is fair to give some sort of representativeness to the chemical industry and to take into consideration costs and economic assessments, but not to the extent that such factors can dictate decisions to the detriment of stricter and more rigorous measures of control.

What is essential for Chile is to create machinery that would provide opportunities for participation to all States active in disarmament, rather than to the defenders of the status quo. We therefore propose that any amendment to the chapter on the executive council should take into account the need to readjust Latin American representation in that organ of the future organization. However, despite this and other difficulties, I wish to reiterate that overall my country accepts the draft presented by the Chairman

(Mr. Tironi, Chile)

of the Committee, Ambassador von Wagner. We also congratulate him and his delegation for the great diplomatic skill deployed in conducting these intensive negotiations. For our part, as a manifestation of our resolve to implement the convention speedily, we reiterate our readiness to organize a regional seminar that would help to put the chemical weapons convention into practice.

We have listened with much interest to what has been said by several delegations in this plenary about the appropriateness of restructuring the Conference's agenda and expanding the number of member States. In this regard, as other countries have said, we think it would be very appropriate to entrust consultations on these aspects to the Secretary-General, Ambassador Berasategui, who we are sure once again will take these steps not only with his customary tact and intelligence but also with the efficiency required to ensure their success.

I cannot fail to restate the views of my country on the subject of expansion. This is a topic on which a decision has been deferred too long and which has been practically ignored at this session, with the exception of Ambassador Hyltenius and a few others who have shown understanding of the problem. We feel that Chile should become a full member of this forum. We have given sufficient demonstration of our constructive operation and interest in its work. We therefore hope that the report that will go to the General Assembly will be worded in different terms from previous years, so that we can be sure that in the first few months of 1993, the Conference will really set to work to solve this issue. It is essential to bring to bear here the new democratic spirit that prevails in the international community and to enable countries taking specific action towards disarmament to take part on an equal footing in this multilateral forum.

In his recent statement here in June, the Under-Secretary for Foreign Affairs of my country, Mr. Edmundo Vargas, while pointing to the pressing need to readjust the agenda and procedures of the Conference to bring them into harmony with the new era we are living through, reaffirmed the priority that Chile attaches to the cessation of nuclear testing, and the role of science and technology in disarmament, security and development. I wish to highlight the fact that these last points are closely connected with the conversion of armaments industries, and with nuclear safety which is threatened by the obsolescence of various plants. We also attach high priority to the establishment of an international register of arms transfers. Lastly, the Under-Secretary raised here the possibility of convening in the near future another regional conference in Latin America on mutual confidence-building and security-building measures. We are pleased to report that some delegations from countries in our region have stated that they have already transmitted this proposal to their foreign ministries and are studying it favourably. This will allow us very shortly to go forward with this initiative.

In closing, we are now witnessing every day the suffering of millions of human beings who are victims of the uncontrolled use of weapons of mass destruction. Hence we consider we must not forget that the reason we meet here is to build a climate of trust among peoples so that it will become

(Mr. Tironi, Chile)

increasingly less necessary to have recourse to weapons in order to attain peace. It is with this objective in mind that Chile supports the conclusion very shortly of the convention on chemical weapons, and it is ready to continue to adopt measures in the sphere of disarmament and arms control to promote international security and world peace.

The PRESIDENT: I thank the representative of Chile for his statement and for the kind words addressed to the Chair. I now give the floor to the Chairman of the Ad Hoc Committee on Effective International Arrangements to Assure Non-nuclear-weapon States against the Use or Threat of Use of Nuclear Weapons, Ambassador Nasseri of the Islamic Republic of Iran, who will introduce the report of that subsidiary body, as contained in document CD/1160.

Mr. NASSERI (Islamic Republic of Iran): Allow me first of all, Mr. President, to express my satisfaction at seeing you in the Chair and to wish you success in discharging your weighty responsibility at this important and perhaps hectic juncture of our work. Your diplomatic skill and experience will no doubt contribute significantly to a satisfactory conclusion of the work of the Conference on Disarmament this year.

I have asked for the floor to introduce the draft report of the Ad Hoc Committee on Effective International Arrangements to Assure Non-nuclear-weapon States against the Use or Threat of Use of Nuclear Weapons, as distributed in document CD/1160, which was adopted by the Ad Hoc Committee at its last meeting on 3 August 1992 as document CD/SA/CRP.20/Rev.1.

As in the case of other ad hoc committees, the work of the Ad Hoc Committee on negative security assurances and its report have also been affected by the focus and attention this year given to the Ad Hoc Committee on Chemical Weapons to enable it to conclude negotiations on the prohibition of chemical weapons within 1992. However, this form of abridged meetings and report have not prevented us from pin-pointing the substantive work which I am confident will be pursued with more vigour next year.

In addition to the so-called technical part of the report, reflected in the first and second sections, the third part has highlighted some important achievements this year. Paragraph 5 notes that "these consultations reveal that all delegations, including those of the nuclear-weapon States, continued to attach importance to the agenda item and were ready to engage in substantive discussions on the issue". This progress, namely acceptance by all delegations instead of a majority, marks noticeable progress which can facilitate our work next year.

Part 4 of the report sets out the conclusions and recommendations of the Ad Hoc Committee, stating that "the formal debates and informal consultations demonstrated the readiness of delegations to continue the search for a common approach on the substance of negative security assurances". Finally, the Ad Hoc Committee has agreed to recommend by consensus to the Conference on Disarmament that the Committee should be re-established at the beginning of the 1993 session.

(Mr. Nasseri, Islamic Republic of Iran)

In the light of recent developments in international relations which have been highlighted here in the Conference on Disarmament and the fact that nuclear doctrines need to be reviewed, it is my delegation's conviction that a window of opportunity has been opened to have a fresh look at all subjects pertaining to nuclear weapons, including negative security assurances. I am confident that this opportunity will be seized next year and the Ad Hoc Committee, based on its achievements thus far and a favourable political environment, will register significant achievements in 1993.

While expressing my sincere thanks to all delegations who have placed confidence in me and helped me to carry out my task, I would like to thank the secretariat and the interpreters for their contribution and their help to me in preparing this report which is before the Conference on Disarmament as document CD/1160 dated 3 August 1992 for adoption.

The PRESIDENT: I thank the Chairman of the Ad Hoc Committee for introducing the report of his subsidiary body and, if I may be permitted to do so, I should like to congratulate him and his Committee for having produced a report which is not only substantive but short, an ideal rarely achieved which deserves emulation, if I may say so. I now give the floor to the representative of Canada, Ambassador Shannon.

Mr. SHANNON (Canada): Mr. President, we in the Canadian delegation are most appreciative of the work you have done in ably guiding the Conference in its concluding phase this summer and we certainly hope that your efforts will be rewarded with tne conclusion of a chemical weapons convention.

Canada has been a member of the Conference on Disarmament and all of its precursors since the original establishment of the first Disarmament Commission (comprising the nine members of the Security Council plus Canada) in January 1952, and we have participated actively in the negotiations on a chemical weapons convention since their inception back in 1968. We strongly believe that the current Ad Hoc Committee Chairman's proposed text of a chemical weapons convention (WP.400/Rev.1) is very likely to prove to be the most effective outcome of our recent deliberations that can be obtained. As is also the case for a very large majority of the other members and participating observers working on this item, we stand prepared to accept it in its entirety.

It is also a fact that this text is far from being the ideal chemical weapons convention that Canada would have preferred to see adopted. However, it reflects the result of literally years of thorough, complex negotiations during which many States have had to concede ground on issues which they considered to be extremely important but for which they could not attract the consensus support of others. As it stands now, therefore, the Chairman's text is probably fully satisfactory to none among the CD's member States but despite this, because it is the result in particular of our intensive negotiations during this year's CD session, virtually all of its elements are now generally acceptable. Some States would still like to see further changes adopted. Most of these proposals for changes have been tabled in WP.417 and 419, with others having been put forward by Cuba and Peru. While some

(Mr. Shannon, Canada)

among these various proposals are new, most represent old positions that failed to gain acceptance earlier but which are still being pursued. This latter category of would-be amendments, particularly in so far as either they would further weaken the already very much watered-down inspection and verification regime or in that they relate to changes to particular issues of some contention and are already clearly unacceptable to many, seem to have little prospect of adoption. Why then, we wonder, are they still before us? How important are they really, and how crucial are they to the national security or policy concerns of their supporters?

All of us have already had to make compromises to get as far as the text in WP.400/Rev.1, Canada perhaps more than most, since we were and still are among the strongest supporters of a truly confidence-building inspection regime which would be rapid, thorough and comprehensive. Thus, under challenge the old idea of the right to call for inspection any time, anywhere and to have it take place virtually at once without any constraints on the inspectors would still be a provision with which Canada would have felt safest. The challenge provisions now in WP.400/Rev.1 are a far cry from that approach, given the lengthy time-frames, the restrictions on the discretion left to the inspectors, and in the increased degree of protection now afforded to the inspected State party. In the same way, Canada has problems with the provisions on routine inspection of the chemical industry and with the narrow definition of "capable facilities". So we are not, by any means, entirely happy with WP.400/Rev.1 and with the compromises with our own preferred objectives that we have had to make to accept it. Our bottom line, however, is that it would be very foolish of us to allow a wish for only the very best of results to obstruct the possibility of our instead obtaining what is, none the less, an acceptable CWC regime. Even as it is, CD/CW/WP.400/Rev.1 does meet (albeit in some respects only just) Canada's three basic criteria for an acceptable convention. First, it is comprehensive: it calls for a complete ban on the development, production, stockpiling, retention or use of CW and their precursors. Second, it is global, or at least it has the potential to be so if others too show flexibility: already, like Canada, a significant number of States from all geographic regions have indicated they can support and would be prepared to be original signatories. And we are convinced the vast majority of the rest of the world will join us. Third, it is effectively verifiable: though the regime as I said before is not as strong as we would have wished, it nevertheless establishes new norms of verification and inspection that far surpass any previous multilateral arms control and disarmament instruments.

In Canada's opinion, and this is also our wish, the time has now therefore come for all of us negotiating here in the CD to put aside unrealistic, unachievable long-standing preferences, to resolve our differences and to coalesce behind WP.400/Rev.1. It is, after all, that text which we together, in our long negotiations, as well as our Chairman alone, on the basis of his understanding of what final compromises could prove generally acceptable, have so laboriously constructed. Surely it deserves our common support and we very much fear that, if we cannot achieve a consensus on this text now, we may end up with no CWC at all.

Mr. NEAGU (Romania): Mr. President, may I first of all express my pleasure at seeing you in the Chair at this crucial juncture of our deliberations on the chemical weapons convention? Your knowledge of the problem, your skill and devotion to the finalization of the draft convention are widely appreciated. It is our hope that under your guidance we shall be able to attain our objective of coming to a general agreement on the text under discussion. I would also like to express our thanks and appreciation for the important work that has been accomplished by your immediate predecessors, Ambassadors Abdelhamid Semichi of Algeria and Roberto García Moritán of Argentina. May I take this opportunity to welcome in our midst the new colleagues, Ambassador Weston of Great Britain, Ambassador Goonetilleke of Sri Lanka, Ambassador Morales of Cuba and Ambassador Dembinski of Poland? I want to assure all of them of my full cooperation.

I have had occasion to present the position of my delegation with respect to different aspects of the draft convention on chemical weapons in the Ad Hoc Committee on the subject. Now I am in the position to inform the Conference that the Romanian Government, after careful examination of the text of the draft convention on the prohibition of the development, production, stockpiling and use of chemical weapons and their destruction, as contained in document CD/CW/WP.400/Rev.1 of 22 June 1992, has decided to accept this text as it is. My Government considers that, like any human undertaking, the existing draft convention could, eventually, be further improved, but the commitment to conclude this convention outweighs by far any other possible considerations. Certainly, if some slight last-minute consensus changes can be accommodated in order to widen the area of adherence to the convention, we are prepared to accept them. However, one has to take into account that the draft convention, like any other such instrument, represents a common denominator, keeping in a carefully thought-out balance the various interests and viewpoints expressed during years of negotiations. As far as Romania is concerned, we are prepared to initial the draft convention at any level on which consensus might be reached, so that the text can be submitted to the coming United Nations General Assembly session for endorsement and recommendation for signature.

Should countries choose to prepare a draft United Nations resolution having a number of co-sponsors, Romania would be very pleased to join such an initiative. In case other forms of submission to the United Nations General Assembly are envisaged, we would be prepared to favourably consider them as well. Romania is also ready to play an active role, at all levels, in the implementation of the future convention, including the entering into operation of the envisaged executive council and the technical secretariat. While congratulating the delegation of the Netherlands on the selection of The Hague as the headquarters of the future organization, we want to assure the Dutch Government of all our support in the fulfilment of its important responsibility as host Government.

The PRESIDENT: I thank the representative of Romania for his statement and for the kind words addressed to the Chair. I now give the floor to the representative of the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland, Ambassador Sir Michael Weston.

Sir Michael WESTON (United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland): As we approach the end of the negotiations on the chemical weapons convention, I wish to explain to the Conference the United Kingdom's views on the draft text contained in working paper 400/Revision 1.

When I made my first statement to the Conference just two months ago, I mentioned a number of the points in the chemical weapons convention to which the United Kingdom attached particular importance. It is from this standpoint that I approach the Chairman's text.

First, I mentioned the importance of challenge inspection and the need for a prompt and automatic response to a State party's request for an inspection; for the inspection to be effective and intrusive; and for follow-up action to be taken where necessary, by the executive council and/or the conference of States parties. The United Kingdom believes that the provisions in the Chairman's draft represent the absolute minimum of acceptability, both in respect of the procedures prior to an inspection and in the rapidity and degree of intrusiveness of an inspection. We remain of the view that it is neither necessary nor appropriate for the executive council, as the political organ of the organization, to be involved in the launching of a challenge inspection. By increasing the role of the executive council before a challenge inspection, the text risks undermining the effectiveness of the inspection procedure.

Secondly, I mentioned the need for a challenging State to have the mandatory right to send an observer with the inspection team. We are disappointed that the text contains no guarantee for the challenging State to be able to send an observer. We believe this would have significantly enhanced the effectiveness and confidence-building aspect of challenge inspection. The provision that an observer shall be accepted "as a rule" goes some way to meeting our concerns and we shall be keen to see that it is adhered to in practice. But we find the treatment of the observer in the text far from satisfactory.

Thirdly, I expressed the view that routine monitoring of chemical industry, on a broad and non-discriminatory basis, with well-targeted inspections, was an important element in deterring misuse of civilian chemical plants and of industrially important chemicals. We have always considered such monitoring as the second pillar of the verification structure. The provisions in working paper 400/Revision 1 fall well short of what we believe would be the most effective and efficient regime. In particular, we are disappointed to see that the implementation of the inspection phase for other chemical production facilities is to be delayed and made subject to a decision to be taken at a later stage. We are also disappointed that more importance is not given to the role that States parties might play in helping to target such inspections. The references to so-called PSF facilities are, to our mind, an unnecessary and unhelpful complication. The regimes for schedule 2 and schedule 3 chemicals and facilities have also been undesirably weakened in our view. Despite these shortcomings, the article VI regime as it stands in WP.400/Revision 1 can provide, or at least has the potential to provide, a valuable deterrent against abuse of industrial capabilities.

(Sir Michael Weston, United Kingdom)

Fourthly, I stressed the need for riot control agents, the proper use of which would not be prohibited under the convention, to be declared. We were pleased to see that WP.400/Revision 1 contains the declaration requirement to which we attach so much importance. This to our mind plugs a significant potential loophole in the convention.

Fifthly, I mentioned the problem of old and abandoned chemical weapons and the need for a clear obligation for the destruction of abandoned chemical weapons which may still have military potential. We have some reservations regarding the provisions in WP.400/Revision 1 but we could accept them as part of a compromise package on the basis that they provide for a clear obligation for destruction of such weapons.

Sixthly, I mentioned the general destruction provisions and the need for a clear obligation for destruction, even if the 10-year timetable had to be modified in respect of one major chemical weapons possessor, who has been frank about the problems it faces. Whilst we would, ideally, have preferred no exceptions to the 10-year destruction timetable laid down in the convention, we believe that the overall package contained in WP.400/Revision 1 is an acceptable one, and provides sufficient safeguards to prevent any abuse of the possibility, in certain circumstances, of some relaxation of the requirements of the agreed destruction timetable.

Lastly, I mentioned the executive council and the need to reach agreement on arrangements to elect an efficient and fully representative body to oversee the operation of the convention. We believe that the provisions on composition contained in WP.400/Revision 1 provide for satisfactory arrangements for achieving this aim. We should, however, have preferred the phrase "as a rule", introduced in a well-motivated but unsuccessful last-minute attempt to secure agreement, to be omitted.

It will be clear from what I have said that the draft text contained in WP.400/Revision 1 falls short in a number of respects of what the United Kingdom would, ideally, have wished to see in the convention. This is natural in a compromise document. The text is incidentally very far from the sort of dish which would have been produced, had it been pre-cooked, as some have suggested, by a German chef, with various Western helpers, in an Italian kitchen.

Throughout the long history of these negotiations, my delegation has worked in a constructive spirit in pursuit of a convention which would both meet basic security requirements and be able to attract sufficiently widespread support to bring about a truly global and effective ban on chemical weapons. It is in this spirit, and in the belief that the text represents the best achievable in the foreseeable future that the United Kingdom Government have, after careful consideration, decided that they could accept the text as it stands in WP.400/Revision 1.

(Sir Michael Weston, United Kingdom)

I should make clear that we reached this decision with some misgivings. Our first instinct was to take up the Chairman's invitation to table proposals for amendments. We were persuaded to refrain from this, however, because we realized, from the long and intensive discussions that had taken place earlier, that the key changes we desired were, sadly, unlikely to command the full support of the Ad Hoc Committee and that persistent efforts on our part could risk jeopardizing the Ad Hoc Committee's achievements so far. At the same time, we fully respect the right of others to seek changes to the draft, particularly where issues of highest national priority were at stake.

Over the last two weeks, my delegation has participated fully in the discussions on the various amendments which have been proposed. These discussions are continuing and, I hope, will be successfully concluded tomorrow. I am hopeful that agreement can be reached on a number of improvements to the text. But where proposals for amendments have not proved to be nearer the middle ground than the text of WP.400/Revision 1, I would appeal to the sponsors of those amendments not to persist with them. It is only in this way that we can move forward together towards our common goal and conclude the convention this year.

While I have the floor, I should like to refer to the statement made by the representative of France and to put on record my Government's pleasure at the fact that on Monday last, 3 August 1992, the French Chargé d'affaires in London deposited with the United Kingdom Government an instrument of accession to the nuclear non-proliferation Treaty. By this act, he completed the action announced by President Mitterrand on 31 May last year and which had been urged upon successive French Governments by my Government and all other parties to the Treaty since the Treaty first came into force more than 20 years ago. France's accession to the NPT is an important step forward for the nuclear non-proliferation regime and, following China's accession in March, brings all nuclear-weapon States into the Treaty. It underlines the redoubled commitment of France and other countries, in the wake of the Gulf war, to uphold and strengthen the international consensus against nuclear proliferation. As a depositary State for the Treaty, the United Kingdom has worked to encourage universal adherence and my Government hope that all other States not party, including important States members of this Conference, will follow France's lead. We look forward to working with France to secure further accessions to the Treaty and to achieving its indefinite extension in 1995.

Mr. POLHO (Finland): We are living the last and decisive days of negotiation on the chemical weapons convention. The delegation of Finland is convinced that the convention has to be finalized now or there is a grave risk of missing the historic opportunity completely - to the detriment of mankind. In this now-or-never situation one has to evaluate carefully the pros and cons of the convention in its present form or in the form that could conceivably emerge after these last two days of negotiations. And to weigh them against the pros and cons of any outcomes that might be achieved in the future, against the risk of not being able to conclude a convention at all.

(Mr. Pölhö, Finland)

Finland has done this evaluation and weighing. The Chairman's text contained in document CD/CW/WP.400/Rev.1 is in various parts considerably different from what we had throughout the years thought should be achieved in the chemical weapons convention. As with many other delegations the main disappointments in that text from our point of view are to be found in the verification parts. Without going into details, our main concerns are centred on the overall effectiveness and objectivity of the regime.

As is well known, the principal focus of Finland's contribution to these negotiations has been technical and scientific. It is a source of satisfaction to us to be able to recognize still some of this input in the text. The loss of intrusiveness in the verification regime has not led to an undue loss of scientific precision whenever science is applied in the implementation of the convention.

For the past 10 days we have carefully studied proposed amendments to the Chairman's text and observed the discussion on them. From the Finnish perspective, only a few of the proposed amendments - two or three, to be more precise - would improve the final outcome. And even then only marginally. The majority of the proposals, if adopted, would weaken the text further. And certain of them in a very considerable manner indeed. The discussion on the proposals has also shown clearly that reaching consensus on the majority of these proposals is very difficult, if not impossible.

Tomorrow, at the end of the day, we may well be in a situation where the best compromise between the widely varying preferred positions of delegations continues to be the Chairman's text. That result is acceptable to the Government of Finland.

Mr. TANAKA (Japan): First of all, Mr. President, let me congratulate you on your assumption of the presidency of the Conference on Disarmament. My delegation believes that your able guidance will certainly enable us to realize an excellent job in this Conference on Disarmament this year. I also would like to welcome all the new ambassadors who have recently assumed their posts in this Conference.

I asked for the floor to make clear our position on the CWC today. It was some 20 years ago in a completely different international environment that we first embarked on the process of establishing a convention for the prohibition of chemical weapons. It was really a daring attempt. For a long period, though, this attempt did not produce any tangible result. Nevertheless, after long painstaking efforts by everybody in the Conference on Disarmament, and under the chairmanship of our dear colleague Ambassador von Wagner, tomorrow we will come to conclude our long process of negotiations on the CWC.

Even at the beginning of this year, only a few people foresaw that we would be able to bridge so large a gap among countries concerned on so many issues in the CWC. Today, we have still quite a number of problems in the draft text of the CWC, some of which, we think, need really to be negotiated for improvement. But we understand that we cannot continue indefinitely our

(Mr. Tanaka, Japan)

negotiation and we have to share the burdens in one way or another among member States of the CD so that we can eliminate the scourge of CW from the Earth as soon as possible. Further continuation of the negotiation will not necessarily offer us a better perspective for a better CWC; on the contrary, we'll simply lose the momentum and reach nowhere.

The Government of Japan, therefore, strongly hopes that all the necessary process on the CWC will be concluded by the end of this year. As I mentioned a few moments earlier, we still have several points unsatisfactory to us at this moment; nevertheless, we are ready to make it clear that the Government of Japan is studying the draft convention text embodied in document CD/CW/WP.400/Rev.1 with the intention of, in principle, supporting it.

The PRESIDENT: I thank the representative of Japan for his statement and for the kind words he addressed to the Chair.

I would now like to proceed to make some observations of my own at the conclusion of the Australian presidency. I would also like to take this opportunity to make a statement on behalf of the group of countries known as the Australia Group.

As this is the last plenary over which I will be presiding, I would now like to proceed to make some observations about the operation and the contents of the work of this Conference.

Concerning the operation of the Conference, I would like to note firstly that the four-week rotation of the presidency in my experience makes it very difficult to take forward in any sustained or considered way the many questions that come before the President. In my view many of these issues of both a procedural or substantive kind would benefit from more systematic input and more timely preparation. If we are to continue with this very short rotation period for each President, one consequence could be to give a more prominent and clearly defined role to our Secretary-General. He is the repository of our collective experience and the possessor of the detailed knowledge of what has been going on and what needs to be done. In my view, we need to exploit his rich vein of experience and wisdom.

Another possibility would be to expand the relationship between the current President and his predecessor and successor. Although I can sympathize with this idea I nevertheless have some difficulties with imagining how it might work in practice. Since I understand Ambassador Kamal will be taking up his consultations on improved and effective functioning of our Conference, I hope both of these elements might be given some further consideration, that is to say the issue of the period of each presidency and what we can reasonably expect our Secretary-General and his staff to do.

Turning then to matters of substance, I would first of all want to put on record that it is a matter of regret to my Government that we have not been able to re-establish the Ad Hoc Committee on a Nuclear Test Ban. As you will remember, I expressed my frustration at the impasse in our Conference some weeks ago in the hope that, by articulating the disappointment that many of us

(The President)

felt about the difficulties with the re-establishment, there might have been greater efforts to get the Committee into place. But that has not proved to be so up to this point. I recall that the last time the Conference went through a whole annual session without having the Committee, in fact it took several years, I believe seven, before the Committee was finally re-established.

But, of course, there have been many developments of interest in the search for a nuclear test ban, even this week indeed, which ought to have been considered here. These include, not least the moratoriums on testing by France and by Russia and the announcement today by France of its accession to the NPT, which I wholeheartedly welcome of course. Given the very different political climate now, I believe it would be almost inexplicable to our Governments and to the wider interested public if the Conference on Disarmament continued to be unable to address this subject. I certainly anticipate the early re-establishment of this Ad Hoc Committee next year.

The failure to establish an ad hoc committee on transparency in armaments is also, in my view, regrettable. Nevertheless, its inscription on the agenda is a step in the right direction and we appreciate the efforts made by the Special Coordinator, Ambassador Zahran of Egypt, to hold detailed consultations on this subject. It is Australia's view that this Conference needs to pursue actively this issue in 1993.

A notable and welcome feature of this year's activities was the informal open-ended consultations on non-proliferation convened by Ambassador Marin Bosch. We found these discussions interesting, thought-provoking and useful and we hope they will be continued.

Lastly, and most importantly for the Conference this year of course, is the chemical weapons convention. As Ambassador Hyltenius reminded us last week we are now at a decisive moment for the finalization of this treaty. There comes a point in every negotiation of this kind where it is necessary to step back from the minutiae and take a look at the mosaic as a whole. In this case it is more than usually difficult to do so because these negotiations have been going on for so long, because they involve such technically complex details and because above all they go to the heart of national security.

As the negotiations over the past three weeks have shown, the areas of different national preference are well known. Precisely because there are these well-known preferences, some of which are diametrically opposed, we needed the contribution of our Chairman who, at our collective request, undertook the daunting task of developing a complete draft convention that made sense, that would work in practice, that balanced various sets of interests, and that overall would satisfy the minimum security and commercial interests of all States.

I need hardly say that as a consequence he has gone a long way from Australia's preferred position. But as Senator Evans has written to each of your foreign ministers in recent days, we all know that if we are to achieve a

(The President)

convention that is capable of offering to all States a more secure environment and to provide to all States a more confident environment for trade in chemicals, all of us will have to compromise on our national preferences. We believe, as do so many others, that the text in working paper 400/Rev.1 does that in an equitable and fair manner. Despite our wish that some of its contents were different we are prepared to work actively to make it a successful example of a cooperative multilateral endeavour.

This is a matter that involves our professionalism: we are charged with identifying and bringing to fruition the maximum common ground in the areas of arms control and security by negotiating disarmament treaties on a multilateral basis. Failure to do so is not just a matter of regret: it is a test of our credibility and our raison d'être.

It is also the case that there can be a number of activities outside the formal regime of the treaty that could be helpful in clarifying some of the questions that have been raised and which may be a source of false fears.

In this context I wish to refer in particular to the activities of the Australia Group. These are informal consultations on harmonizing export control policies which were initiated in the absence of any global agreement on this subject. This issue has come up in the discussion about article XI of the chemical weapons convention. In order to help address some of the concerns that have been raised in that discussion I am authorized to make the following statement:

"The following States: Australia, Austria, Belgium, Canada, Denmark, Finland, France, Germany, Greece, Ireland, Italy, Japan, Luxembourg, Netherlands, New Zealand, Norway, Portugal, Spain, Sweden, Switzerland, the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland and the United States of America, members of the 'Australia Group', welcome the forthcoming signing of the convention on the prohibition of chemical weapons.

"This convention, the first multilateral disarmament agreement of a universal character to include an international verification regime, offers a unique opportunity to eliminate a whole class of inhumane and abhorrent weapons.

"The strengthening of world security which will derive from the effective implementation of this convention should be accompanied by increased cooperation among States. This is the objective of article XI of the convention, which the above-mentioned States undertake fully to comply with.

"This article aims at facilitating the fullest possible exchanges in the field of chemical activities for purposes not prohibited under the convention so as to promote the harmonious economic or technological development of all States parties.

(The President)

"The above-mentioned States are particularly aware of the need to preserve the proper balance between, on the one hand, the imperatives of the economic and technological development of States, especially in the chemical field, and, on the other hand, the security constraints placed upon them.

"The use which can be made of certain chemical products and equipment for purposes prohibited under the convention should cause States which are future parties to the convention to exercise the greatest vigilance so that the desire to ensure the greatest chance of development to all does not as a consequence facilitate, for certain proliferators, prohibited activities which constitute a potential threat to global security.

"The above-mentioned States consider that the convention on the prohibition of chemical weapons, of which they undertake to be original signatories, will be a most valuable instrument to reach this goal.

"They undertake to review, in the light of the implementation of the convention, the measures that they take to prevent the spread of chemical substances and equipment for purposes contrary to the objectives of the convention, with the aim of removing such measures for the benefit of States parties to the convention acting in full compliance with their obligations under the convention.

"They intend thus to contribute actively to an increase in commercial and technological exchanges between States and to the universal and full implementation of the convention on the prohibition of chemical weapons."

That concludes the statement on behalf of the Australia Group of countries.

As a subject directly related to the role of the Conference, once we have concluded the chemical weapons convention, I would like to comment on the interventions made by Ambassador Marin Bosch of Mexico. He raised the idea of open-ended consultations at head-of-delegation level to be convened by the President or the Secretary-General to address matters of particular concern or importance. The representative of Sweden, Ambassador Hyltenius, also made a number of interesting points about our agenda, the expansion of the membership and other questions. The representative of Cuba, Ambassador Morales, advanced as well his ideas and suggestions about these matters, which he defined as of vital importance for the work of our Conference, during his intervention at our plenary meeting last week. These ideas seem to me worthy of further exploration. I have started sounding with some of our colleagues on them, with the assistance of the Secretary-General, and have found positive reactions to further contacts on these questions. But there was insufficient time to consult widely enough about it to allow me to convene such consultations as Ambassador Marin Bosch had proposed. Again, I hope that these ideas might be explored further by the incoming President, to whom I pledge my assistance on this matter, as well as to the Secretary-General of the Conference.

(The President)

Finally, I would like to thank the Secretary-General, Ambassador Berasategui, for his unfailing courtesy, quiet efficiency and his dedication to assisting our work. He and his staff have been a great help to me and they have my thanks and appreciation.

I would also like to pledge to my successor, Ambassador Servais of Belgium, my full assistance and cooperation. He is an able and experienced diplomat and I know the Conference will be in good hands under his stewardship.

That concludes my remarks. Are there any other representatives who would wish to take the floor at this stage? I see the representative of the Ukraine, Ambassador Ozadovski.

Mr. OZADOVSKI (Ukraine) (translated from Russian): Mr. President, first of all I would like to associate myself with the many words of congratulation which have already been extended to you. Your wealth of experience and diplomatic skills will undoubtedly help us to achieve significant progress in the work of the Conference on Disarmament as it concludes its work for this year. Allow me to wish you further substantial success in leading the discussions at this session, and to assure you that the delegation of Ukraine is ready to give you every assistance in carrying out your important duties.

It is my privilege to address the plenary meeting of the Conference on Disarmament on behalf of the delegation of Ukraine at a time when in the work of the Conference there are clear signs of decisive progress in certain important areas of its activity. In this connection I would like to stress in particular that from the very first steps towards the re-establishment of its statehood, Ukraine solemnly proclaimed and has firmly adhered to the principles of the strengthening of international security, and took an active part in the burgeoning process of disarmament, first and foremost nuclear disarmament. Ukraine, with its significant nuclear potential, was the first State in the history of mankind to voluntarily declare its wish and resolve to rid itself of the whole arsenal of atomic weapons. Speaking recently at NATO headquarters, the President of our country, Leonid Kravchuk, confirmed once again that "Ukraine, one of the largest countries in Europe, will never constitute a threat to other States". Our military doctrine is purely defensive in nature. It is based on the need to have the minimum army and navy required to defend our independence and territorial integrity, the inviolability of our frontiers and the rights and freedoms of our citizens. The creation of Ukraine's own armed forces will go hand in hand with significant reductions in the forces and weaponry which are currently deployed in the country. Having firmly decided to reduce and destroy the nuclear potential which was an inheritance from the former Soviet Union, Ukraine intends in the very near future to ratify the Treaty on the limitation and reduction of strategic offensive arms and, by the end of the century, to rid itself fully of all types of nuclear weapons. As for tactical nuclear missiles, they were all removed from the territory of Ukraine to Russia for destruction as early as May this year, that is to say two months before the deadline established by the Treaty.

(Mr. Ozadovski, Ukraine)

In our country we attach great importance to the implementation of the agreements pursuant to the START Treaty signed in Lisbon on 23 May 1992. In accordance with these agreements the Ministry of Defence of the Ukraine, in cooperation with the joint command of the armed forces of the Commonwealth of Independent States, is already engaged in drawing up a joint plan of action to stand down strategic nuclear missiles and remove them from the territory of Ukraine.

In giving due attention to speeding up the process of nuclear disarmament globally by all possible means, Ukraine considers that this process needs to be accompanied by active and specific actions for nuclear disarmament at the national and regional levels. In particular we actively support the idea that the Black Sea should become a nuclear-free zone. Further confirmation of our readiness to contribute to the realization of this idea can be seen in the fact that on 3 August this year, in Yalta, Ukraine and the Russian Federation concluded an agreement on principles to govern the creation of a Ukrainian navy and a Russian navy from the Black Sea fleet of the former USSR. In this document, which is intended to strengthen security in this broad region, the two major Black Sea States officially referred to "the advisability of a policy designed to turn the Black Sea into a nuclear-free zone, a zone of peace and cooperation". The agreement between Ukraine and Russia on the Black Sea fleet, preparations for which were followed with a great deal of attention not only by the peoples of the two States but also by those of other countries of the Black Sea region and, it can be said without exaggeration, by the whole international community, is based on the provisions of the agreement signed on 23 June this year on further development of inter-State relations between the two countries. Under the agreement the Black Sea fleet will be divided between Ukraine and Russia in order to create a Ukrainian navy and a Russian Federation navy. Bearing in mind the interests of these two friendly States, and in an endeavour to guarantee security in the Black Sea basin, Ukraine and Russia decided that pending the formation in the Black Sea of the Ukrainian navy and the Russian navy they would institute a transitional period up to the year 1995 inclusive.

For the transitional period, the Black Sea fleet was withdrawn from the joint armed forces of the Commonwealth of Independent States from the moment when the agreement was signed and brought directly under the command of the Presidents of the Ukraine and the Russian Federation. During the transitional period the Black Sea fleet is to be manned by conscripts from the Ukraine and Russia in equal proportions (50 per cent from each). Up until 1995, the parties to the agreement will make joint use of the existing basing systems and matériel, in compliance as appropriate with the legislation of the two countries and without any interference in each other's internal affairs.

The delegation of the Ukraine welcomes the statement made today by Ambassador Errera of France, who informed us that France had acceded to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons in August this year. The accession of this nuclear-weapon State to that international treaty is undoubtedly an important step towards the strengthening of the non-proliferation regime for the most lethal type of weapon of mass destruction.

(Mr. Ozadovski, Ukraine)

In taking the floor today, our delegation would also like to inform you that one of the immediate aims of Ukrainian nuclear disarmament policy is to become a party to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons. Achievement of this goal should become a decisive element in putting into practice the fundamental principles of national security which were solemnly proclaimed two years ago by the Parliament of our country in the declaration on the State sovereignty of Ukraine. The most important of these principles is the intention "to become in the future a permanently neutral State which takes no part in military blocs and adheres to the three non-nuclear principles: not to use, to produce or to acquire nuclear weapons". The sincere desire of our country to follow these principles and to back them up with practical actions can be seen in the fact that last month the Supreme Soviet of Ukraine ratified the Treaty on Conventional Armed Forces in Europe and the agreement on the principles and procedure for its implementation. The decision adopted by our Parliament on this subject underlines yet again Ukraine's wish to be fully integrated into the pan-European process, to make its own contribution, together with other European States, to the implementation of this most important international legal instrument, one of the main elements of the foundations of the new security system in Europe.

In our view the CFE Treaty has not only made a significant contribution to the reduction of military confrontation and the threat of military conflicts in the continent; its signing marks a substantial change in the mind-sets of recent years. The entry into force of the Treaty will make it possible for all States in Europe, including Ukraine, to build peaceful, good-neighbourly relations amongst themselves in a climate of security and confidence, will help to reduce military expenditure, and will make it possible to direct our efforts first of all towards solving economic and social problems, inter alia, through the conversion of a significant part of the defence industry and military potential.

The present session of the Conference on Disarmament is taking place against the backdrop of a qualitatively new political situation in the world, featuring a shift from ideological divergences and rivalry to extensive international cooperation and partnership. This situation has created a favourable basis for significant breakthroughs in the solution of a number of problems which have accumulated over many years in the field of disarmament, both within the Conference on Disarmament and outside it. The most urgent issue for all the participants in the Conference today is undoubtedly the task of rapidly completing work on the draft convention on chemical weapons. The revised draft of this fundamental document prepared by the Ad Hoc Committee on Chemical Weapons and now under consideration in the Conference on Disarmament is the fruit of many years of effort on the part of diplomats, the military, experts and specialists from various countries.

Many delegations have already noted that the draft convention on the prohibition and destruction of chemical weapons is a delicate, painstaking balance of interests, an original compromise version taking account of the well-known positions of individual countries. Naturally, we can find many opportunities for improving the text and for further development of it.

(Mr. Ozadovski, Ukraine)

But it may be noted with satisfaction that the majority of delegations have understood the vital need for the rapid conclusion of the convention and are making serious efforts to achieve successful completion of work on the preparation of a final text. Our delegation, like the delegations of many other countries, sincerely hopes that the convention will be opened for signature before the end of this year. We are ready to cooperate further to improve the draft, and if certain other delegations of countries participating in the convention feel it necessary to revert to the submission of amendments and concrete proposals, our delegation also reserves the right to express its own observations on the draft document where necessary.

The new political situation which is developing in the world requires a radical rethink of the conventional approaches to such well-established concepts as security, international cooperation and development. Again we are seeing far-reaching changes on a global scale, which, whether we like it or not, will have an influence on the way States behave and on generally accepted standards and principles. Despite the fact that there is no longer any total military threat, and that there is no longer any balance of terror or direct confrontation, with many people now beginning to rid themselves of the sense of danger that new world wars will break out, nevertheless, tragic events related to military conflicts in a number of regions of the world warn us that such a danger has not completely passed. Because even small local conflicts carry within them major threats to peace. Potential examples of this, unfortunately, are the conflicts in Europe, the most densely populated continent on the planet, which are growing with unchecked speed and extent. Analysis of these conflicts shows that we are now dealing with a new kind of security problem. It is clear that the former military/political stand-off between blocs in separate regions has been replaced by dangerous conflict situations associated with unresolved national issues, caused by irresponsible calls for the revision of existing State frontiers.

In such conditions, naturally, the principles set forth in the Helsinki Final Act and the Paris Charter for a New Europe become extremely important. Today, perhaps as never before, there is a need for single-minded creative work to put these principles into practice. This in its turn requires a further all-round improvement of the effectiveness of the CSCE machinery. A significant innovative contribution to the achievement of this aim can, we think, be found in the results of the recent fourth all-European CSCE meeting. However, the present situation requires a further significant boost in the arsenal of means to build peace, including the creation of new instruments to prevent conflict. We fully endorse the proposals drawn up in Helsinki on the use of peace-keeping operations under the CSCE umbrella, including the potential of such organizations as the European Communities, NATO and the Western European Union. At the same time these proposals require more thorough elaboration. We need first and foremost to determine the legal basis for such machinery and the criteria for bringing it into play, taking account in particular of the principle of non-interference in the internal affairs of States. The recent agreements in the military and political sphere and accords in the field of disarmament are of great importance for the

(Mr. Ozadovski, Ukraine)

further stabilization of the situation and the strengthening of security in Europe. I am thinking first and foremost of the Treaty on Conventional Armed Forces in Europe and the Vienna document 1992, the open skies Treaty and the final act of the negotiations on troop numbers in Europe. In this connection, I would like to stress once again that the entry into force of the CFE Treaty and the Vienna document not only make a significant contribution to the reduction of military confrontation and the threat of armed conflicts, but also constitute a radical break with the mind-sets of the past.

In this statement, for obvious reasons, we are dealing mainly with questions of European security and questions of the reduction of armed forces in Europe. But we are convinced that questions of regional security are of great significance for all regions of the world. In the present situation in the world, where a number of old regional and intersational armed conflicts are persisting and new ones are appearing, the role of the Conference on Disarmament, that unique multilateral mechanism, is steadily growing. The completion of work on the draft convention on chemical weapons would seem to mark the end of one of the most important and momentous stages in the work of the Conference. However, our agenda lists new, no less complex tasks related to the guaranteeing of a greater level of international security at lower levels of armaments. In our view the Conference should continue to concentrate the bulk of its attention on drawing up global international legal instruments designed to reduce international tension and consolidate overall security through disarmament. In particular, in view of the work done this year by the Ad Hoc Committee on Radiological Weapons, we believe that as a basis for future work by the Conference on Disarmament in this area next year negotiations could be held on draft articles for a convention to prohibit radiological weapons and possible elements related to the prohibition of attacks on nuclear facilities.

The work of the Conference will be more effective if it has clearly defined priorities and if the most urgent and topical issues are included in its agenda. It is vital for the Conference on Disarmament to adapt itself to the new international situation and to help all it can to consolidate international peace. Of course for this purpose new initiatives will be required, new approaches. We believe that due attention should be given to the comments made by the delegation of Sweden at an earlier plenary meeting, to the effect that we need to take a fresh look at the membership of the Conference and to negotiate on expanding it. The world is changing, and we must make more effective use of the enormous potential embodied in the Conference on Disarmament. Ukraine intends to become a participant in the Geneva multilateral negotiations on disarmament and is ready to contribute to work on the important tasks facing this important international body, the Conference on Disarmament.

The PRESIDENT: I thank the representative of the Ukraine for his statement and for the kind words he addressed to the Chair. I now give the floor to the representative of India, Ambassador Shah.

Mr. SHAH (India): I had not intended to speak this morning but I am doing so in the light of the statement that you made earlier, Mr. President, on behalf of the Australia Group. It is indeed no secret that my Government and that of many developing countries consider unilateral action of this type as discriminatory and hampering the economic and technological development of developing countries. We have always urged that solutions to concerns that may have prompted the activities of the Australia Group lie in multilateral arrangements and agreements arrived at through negotiations and universal participation and not in unilateral actions. We have also indicated repeatedly that there is no place for restraints on international cooperation or export controls by countries acting together outside the convention, once the convention comes into effect. It is with this in mind that amendments to article XI have been presented in the context of the CWC negotiations.

It is heartening that the statement just made by you on behalf of the Australia Group indicates the willingness of the Group to remove measures which restrict international cooperation and trade in the chemical field, even though it is related to fulfilment of certain conditions. While this statement of intention is indicative of the recognition of our concerns and goes some way towards addressing our apprehensions regarding the Australia Group, it is the belief of my delegation that the intent behind this statement should be reflected adequately in article XI of the convention, as and when the present negotiations on WP.400/Rev.1 conclude. It is also my hope that the statement which you read out on behalf of the Australia Group will become an official document of the Conference on Disarmament.

Before I conclude, Sir, let me take the opportunity to present my own personal tribute to you for the stewardship of the Conference on Disarmament during the month that you have been President and the contributions that you have made to the work of the Conference.

The PRESIDENT: I thank the representative of India for his statement and for the kind words he addressed to the Chair. Are there any other representatives wishing to speak at this stage? I do not see any. As I informed you at the plenary meeting of 30 July, I now put before the Conference for adoption the report of the Ad Hoc Committee on Radiological Weapons, contained in document CD/1159. I see no objection to that report and I shall consider therefore that the Conference adopts it.

It was so decided.

The PRESIDENT: The secretariat has circulated the timetable for meetings to be held by the Conference and its subsidiary bodies next week. This timetable is of course indicative and subject to change, if necessary. If there is no objection, I shall consider that the Conference adopts the timetable.

It was so decided.

The PRESIDENT: I have no other business for today. As announced at the beginning of this plenary meeting, the Conference will hold informal open-ended consultations, in this room and with interpretation services, to consider pending questions relating to the draft annual report to the General Assembly. May I also, on behalf of Ambassador Batsanov, remind delegations that open-ended consultations on editing and drafting for the CWC exercise will take place now in room V?

I have no other business, so I will proceed to adjourn this meeting. The next plenary meeting of the Conference on Disarmament will be held on Tuesday, 11 August at 10 a.m.

The meeting rose at 12 noon.